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Article 9

Catholic Hospitals and Sterilization
Rev. William B. Smith, S.T.D.

Father Smith, professor of moral theology at St. Joseph's Seminary,
Dunwoodie, Yonkers, N. Y., received his doctorate in moral theology
in 1971 from Catholic University of America. A member of the Archdiocese of New York's board of medical-moral ethics, he has rep resented the archdiocese on a number of television and radio programs
on matters such as Catholic morality , ethics and the right-to-life.
This article is a revised version of a talk presented to the Health
Affairs Committee of the New York Catholic Conference on March 1,
1977.
In the judgment of some, ours is an age of revisionist history. The
question of direct sterilization in a Catholic health facility is certainly
a question with a history. Some of that history has been written in
this country and in our age. Most of the revisionist theories seem to
thrive in this country, not because of any new medical information,
but because so many moral theories are revised here.
These alleged "breakthroughs" in moral reasoning are often called
"expansions" or "revisions." In fact, some of these very "revisions"
played no small part in occasioning an authentic teaching response
from the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith on this
question of sterilization in Catholic hospitals. When that clear doctrinal response came, some concluded that things were never more unclear.
Recently, two different articles have appeared on this subject going
clearly in different directions. Writing in this journal, Dr. Vitale H.
Paganelli contributed an article 1 which, in my judgment, is substantially correct but which can be improved with some moral precision
about material cooperation. On the other hand, Rev. Kevin D.
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O'Rourke, writing in Hospital Progress, contributed an article 2 which,
in my judgment, is substantially incorrect about material cooperation
and can be disproved with some moral precision on the same point.
Let us locate the point under consideration. In the context of a
Catholic discussion about Catholic facilities, the central point of reference here is the doctrinal teaching in the SCDF's "Document About
Sterilization in Catholic Hospitals" of March 13, 1975 (Cf. following;
while brief, it is necessary reading). The background of this authoritative teaching response is most instructive.
Directive No. 20 of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic
Health Facilities, approved by the bishops of the United States
(NCCB) in 1971, was questioned by .some sources. That directive
reads: 3
"Procedures that induce sterility, whether permanent or temporary are per·
mitted when:
(a) they are immediately directed to the cure, diminution, or prevention of a
serious pathological condition and are not directly contraceptive (that is,
contraception is not the purpose); and
(b)a simpler treatment is not reasonably available.
Hence, for example, oophorectomy or irradiation of the ovaries may be al·
lowed in treating carcinoma of the breast and metastasis therefrom ; and orchi·
dectomy is permitted in the treatment of carcinoma of the prostate." (n .20).

Questions were posed either to the scope and meaning of this directive, or, to the fact that some theologians held the opinion that they
could justify what this directive forbade by way of a so-called "expanded notion of the principle of totality."
The advisory committee on Ethical and Religious Directives for
Catholic Health Facilities of the United States Catholic Conference
was consulted. This advisory committee agreed unanimously that Directive No. 20, as written, did not permit sterilization in the new cases
proposed. Nevertheless, some members of that advisory committee
proposed that Directive No. 20 be changed. This was suggested either
on the basis of the so-called expanded notion of the principle of
totality, or, because many theologians dissented from this teaching
and that dissent which is tolerated is tacitly approved. (The dissent, of
course, concerns the teaching of the Church in the encyclical, Humanae Vitae (7/25/68) n.15; that number 15 is the cited reference for
Directive No. 20 in the Ethical and Religious Directives.)
Since questions within the advisory committee recurred often on
these points, they were referred to Archbishop John R. Quinn, then
chairman of the Pastoral Research and Practices Committee of the
NCCB. Archbishop Quinn decided to bring this to the entire Bishops'
Conference for guidance, and, the Conference, in turn, decided to
appeal to Rome for an authoritative clarification.
Four Questions
Basically, four questions were part of the documentation sent to
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Rome, and it is the last of these which is the question at hand:
"Can we accept the general prohibition of direct sterilization in Catholic hos·
pitals and still make a number of exceptions in particular cases to solve pastoral
problems?"

It is important to note that the questions were not raised simply for
speculative reasons, but also because of practical problems and be·
cause of problems of consistent implementation. In his request to
Rome, Archbishop Quinn stressed some of the pastoral, practical
problems that are involved in reaffirming previous teaching in a fully
consistent way in this country: e.g., possibility of closing hospitals;
conflicts with some theologians; conflicts with some hospital personnel; possible polarization, etc.
The covering letter of the reply from Rome made it clear that both
Pope Paul VI and the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith were
informed about and aware of problems created by pressures coming
from society and from dissent from authentic Catholic teaching as
taught by the Magisterium and expressed in the Ethical and Religious
Directives for Catholic Health Facilities (1971). The SCDF document
responded to these varied questions in the very context just outlined.
As to the question about material cooperation in sterilizations in Catholic hospitals, the SCDF document response is in n.3, a,b,c.
For the sake of brevity, one can accept Dr. Paganelli's larger summary statements. The doctor is correct in saying that in view of this
document and its preceding tradition, there can be no doubt as to the
mind of the Catholic Church in its prohibition of direct sterilization. 4
Further, while the concept of moral cooperation (here, complicity,
assisting the evil deed of another) is ancient, more precise terms of
added precision ("formal/material"; "free/necessary"; "proximate /remote") are generally traced back to the time of St. Alphonsus.5 While
there is to this day conceptual agreement on these points, not all
authors use the same terms to express that agreement. Perhaps a rough
schema could help:
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In the above, all authors agree that formal cooperation in an immoral operation (e.g., direct sterilization) is never permitted. While
some terms of further description differ here, the concept does not.
Formal cooperation fundamentally means that one agrees with what is
going on and helps in accomplishing it. Explicit formal cooperation
means the cooperator intends the evil as does the primary agent.
Implicit formal cooperation (what others call immediate material
cooperation) means that, while not agreeing with the evil, the nature
of the cooperation or assistance supplied is such that it can not be
accomplished without such cooperation. Differences in the last mentioned are merely verbal, since authors agree that implicit formal and/
or immediate material cooperation is never permissible with the possible exception of some matters of the 7th commandment because of
the nature of some justice obligations.6

The question really under discussion is (mediate) material cooperation of a proximate kind and (mediate) material cooperation of a remote kind. For purposes of precision, it is important to recall that just
because a type of cooperation is described as "material," it is not, for
that reason alone, licit cooperation. Such cooperation in or with evil
needs to be justified, i.e., the cooperator has to justify such close
association with evil . Operatively, this is an application of the classic
moral plinciple called "Double Effect" to factual, existing circumstance.
Since the principle of double effect is not the same as the so-called
theory of the lesser of two evils, I would not summarize the matter
simply as "tolerating evil" or "tolerating the lesser evil." Furthermore,
it is true that circumstances loom very large in determining what is
"proximate" and what is "remote" association . However, I would not
say that the consideration of proportionality is truly "superimposed"
on all of this, but rather, that the judgment about proportionality is
relevant to several factors - sometimes in different ways, sometimes
on different levels.
It is at this point that Father O'Rourke's presentation of "material
cooperation" is seriously inadequate and misleading.7 His only operative consideration is one of intention: "if the cooperating individual does not in any way approve of the evil act or the intention of the
principal agent but cooperates in order to avoid a greater evil or to
achieve a greater good," 8 and where he says for the institution:
"would be material provided the hospital did not consent to the objective evil. "9

Certainly, Fr. O'Rourke must be aware that "non-approval" or
"non-consent" is not the only relevant factor. If this were so, all
Catholic facilities could state their formal disapproval (as their Ethical
and R eligious Directives do) and then furnish "space, equipment and
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personnel" for any operation. Having stated our Catholic disapproval,
we would then be in business to "facilitate," under Catholic auspices,
just what the Catholic Church teaches is wrong.
Father O'Rourke cites Cunningham and Vermeersch 10 as filling in
the details of the application of the principle of double effect. But,
this is not accurate . Both authors are explaining only the fourth condition of double effect - the proportionality of the grave reason for
such close association with an evil effect indirectly voluntary. That
fourth condition pertains when and if the previous three conditions
have been fulfilled .
'Objectively Immoral Operation'
In O'Rourke's explanat\on they have not! The physician whom
everyone seems to be "assisting" (cooperating with) is performing an
objectively immoral operation in a Catholic facility. How the Catholic
hospital could furnish "space, equipment and personnel" without
seeing this as either implicit formal cooperation or immediate material
cooperation truly eludes me.
In any moralist's terminology, this is most proximate cooperation:
it is on Catholic premises, with space, equipment and personnel supplied. It is fully free cooperation: because the Catholic facility, contrary to its chartered purposes, offers space, equipment and personnel
to a physician so that he or she can contravene the stated ethical
norms of the Catholic facility. These ethical norms should be part of
the agreed protocols of ethical practice in that Catholic facility.
Further, the question of scandal always pertains (cf. SCDF, Document,n.3,c.). Theologically, scandal is not mere shock or surprise,
rather scandal is any action - word, deed, omission - which is either
evil or has the appearance of evil and is likely to furnish an occasion of
sin to others; a spiritual hazard; a snare for another person. 11
There is just no way to avoid scandal in the O'Rourke analysis
because there is no way to maintain credibility in that arrangement.
Material cooperation is not just a matter of stating individual or institutional disapproval and then providing all the ways and means for
accomplishing what the individual or institution disapprove of. That is
closer to pure semantics than it is to sound moral reasoning. In fact, it
is an inaccurate and inadequate explanation of material cooperation
Had Fr. O'Rourke continued reading one of the authorities he cites (A .
Vermeersch), he would have come upon a correct resolution of the very
point under discussion (cf. below).
I am certainly aware that several writers today do try to explain the
conventional principle of double effect entirely in terms of "proportionate reason," or, as a Catholic version of the so-called theory of the
lesser of two evils.12 Such attempts have not been without serious
and, in my judgment, accurate criticism. 13
May, 1977
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In any event, just as revisionist versions of the principle of totality
helped to occasion this question, revisionist versions of the principle
of double effect will not help resolve it any more than a new version
of the principles of material cooperation will. One problem throughout is that very conventional terminology is used, but used in a way
that is different from and even contrary to what those terms have
meant and do mean.
Now, since the SCDF document states explicitly that any cooperation with direct sterilization is absolutely forbidden (n.3,a.), and, since
indirect sterilization is not treated explicitly I4 in the document, what
conceivable application is there of the principles of material cooperation to direct sterilization in Catholic hospitals?
This is actUally Dr. Paganelli's question to which he concludes that
the mention of material cooperation in the SCDF document must be
assumed to refer to Catholic personnel in non-Catholic institutions.
While the thrust of that statement may be true, I do not think it says
all that's true.
First, the title of the SCDF document is "Sterilization in Catholic
Hospitals" ("In Nosocomiis Catholicis "). Secondly, this is not truly a
brand new question; it is a question with a history. The SCDF document refers to "traditional doctrine regarding material cooperation"
(~.3,b.). The mention of "traditional doctrine" in authoritative ecclesiastical documents refers to and presupposes an accepted terminology, rationale and exposition which can be found in great detail and at
some length in what are referred to as "approved authors."
Thus, such authors as Aertnys-Damen-Visser, Noldin-Schmitt-Heinzel, Zalba, Davis, Vermeersch,15 are authors whose works in moral
theology have been published with ecclesiastical approbation. A correct explanation of the principles of cooperation and the application
of same can be found in these "approved authors" and that exposition
can be taken as an accurate explanation of "traditional doctrine."
Since the moral expressions employed in the SCDF document are
neither novel nor idle terms, the accepted treatment by the "approved
authors" is a most useful place to obtain needed clarification. Thus, a
brief examination of the "approved authors" reveals at least this
much:
(1) All of these authors explain the principles of cooperation at some
length and in extensive detail. 16
(2) All the authors take up the area under consideration, i.e., cooperation in an objectively immoral operation.17 It is for this reason
that I stated above that the question is not truly a new one; it has a
history. Religious orders of women have long been involved in
health care and nursing, as has the Church and many of her members. Long ago, questions of cooperation arose in which religious
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sisters could be involved in objectively immoral procedures.
The "approved authors" held and hold to this distinction:
- Sisters in their own hospitals, i.e., Catholic hospitals. Here there
would be no problem because objectively immoral procedures are
not permitted under religious auspices and sponsorship.
- Sisters in private but non-Catholic, or, public hospitals. Here, the
degree of proximity and necessity of cooperation had to be justified, if at all, on the basis of the common good and the good of
souls that was actual or to be hoped for by continued religious
presence and continued religious service.
Proximate cooperation, of a mediate and material nature, that was
frequent and/or repeated precluded continued employment in such
situations.
Isolated and more remote material cooperation was or was not
justified on a case by case evaluation of real and relevant factors.
(3) The "approved authors" also make this point throughout their
treatment: questions of cooperation are basically concerned with
the actions of individuals, not institutions. This is clear because
they agree that material cooperation is never justified when it
would cause great harm to the Church or to the country since the
greater good takes precedence over the good of the individual. 18
Return to a Central Question
In view of this, let us return again to a central question: what
conceivable licit application could there be of material cooperation in
a direct sterilization in a Catholic hospital?
First, we should note just what the SCDF document mentions: "if
the case warrants" (si casus terat, n.3,b.) and "where the case warrants" (ubi casus t erat, n.3,c.). This subjunctive mention of a possibility does not mean, nor need it infer, that there ever has to be such a
case at all. Some who seem to find material cooperation applying
regularly, seem to take it for granted that since the SCDF document
mentions a possibility, that they are duty bound to "discover" and/or
"invent" factual applications.
Second, it is essential that direct-and-indirect sterilization not be
confused with formal-and-material cooperation. Direct sterilizations
are absolutely forbidden in Catholic hospitals. Since they are forbidden, they should not be done. When they are done, there can be no
question of cooperation of any kind because there will be no procedure performed with which to cooperate . (Indirect sterilizations
that are morally permissible can be performed in a Catholic hospital in
accord with Directive No. 20. One can cooperate in these, and, obviously some must, but there is no moral objection here.)
May, 1977
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Thus, we return to the question: is there any conceivable application in a Catholic hospital? While agreeing with a general "no," perhaps two situations could arise:
(1) Some of the conventional authors consider the case where, unexpectedly and con trary to regulations a surgeon proceeds to do
what the policy of the Catholic facility prohibits, in which instance
nurses and others can continue their assistance by material cooperation to avoid worse evils. 19
(2) Other than that, n.othing short of a one-instance court order could
justify material cooperation in a Catholic facility. That court order
should be opposed and resisted, but given the aggressive nature of
certain allegedly " libertarian" units in our society some Catholic
facility could be initially "coerced" to perform some morally objectionable procedure on very short notice and seem to have little
choice in the matter.
The fact that it is court ordered could resolve the question of
scandal and misunderstanding (SCDF, Document, n.3,c.) in such a
single instance because it could be made clear to the public and to
private persons that institutional and individual choice were not honored in this case but coerced. (Repeated or a series of court orders
would be a different situation requiring different action.)
I do not consider the above as fanciful. By that I do not mean that
it or anything like it should be encouraged, but rather that the Catholic facility should be prepared for such an eventuality.
Apart from the possibilities mentioned, it seems to me that moral,
practical and legal realism should prevail. Some have entertained a
possible policy of individual exceptions in which some morally direct
sterilizations are thought to be justified on a case by case basis. This
too has a legal history in our age and on this continent. By non-Catholic standards such alleged "exceptions" will be perceived as an arbitrary application of stated ethical policy. However well-intentioned or
highly-motivated, exceptions contrary to Catholic policy in a Catholic
facility will render subsequent legal defense of that Catholic institution very weak, if not completely untenable.
In this regard, a recent (11/12/76) case decided in the Supreme
Court of the State of New Jersey, Roe & Doe v. Bridgetown, Newcomb & Salem County Hospitals, set a dangerous and dangerously
close precedent that is likely to become a rallying point for allegedly
"libertarian" units in our society. All three hospitals are private, nonprofit, albeit non-sectarian, institutions, but the judgment was and
reads:
"Moral concepts cannot be the basis of a non-sectarian non-profit eleemonsynary
hospital's regu lations where that hospit al is holding out the use of its facilities
to the general public. " (p. 13)

While the Court in question clearly distinguished religiously affiliated
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hospitals as separate, the logic of a decision is not always contained by
the ' words of a decision. Thus, all the more reason that religiously
affiliated institutions fulfill that affiliation in fact, lest exceptions to
religious policy leave them legally vulnerable and defenseless.
Conclusion
Thus, I conclude that there is no licit application of material cooperation in direct sterilizations in a Catholic hospital. I consider the two
possibilities above as illicit coercion in which licit material cooperation
could be justified. I do not see this as a particularly strained or impractical understanding of the SCDF document's mention of "traditional
doctrine" concerning material cooperation because the questions originally posed to that Congregation involved such practical complications.
Also, the question of individual Catholics in non-Catholic institutions supports, I think, the above conclusion. Matters of material
cooperation remain for them, some permissible, some impermissible,
depending in large part, on the presence and/or absence of a cluster of
factual and relevant circumstances. Indeed, the fact that there certainly are situations of impermissible material cooperation for individual
Catholics in non-Catholic facilities supports the above. Surely, we
could not maintain with consistency that forms of material cooperation forbidden to Catholics in a non-Catholic hospital could somehow
be permissible in a Catholic one.
I have made little mention of those writers who propose opposite
solutions. 20 Some dissent from the teaching of the Church as authentically confirmed in the SCDF document 21 while not being so explicitly radical on the question of Catholic institutional policy.22 In
either case, the competent and authoritative teaching office in the
Church repudiates and disqualifies such opinions from being considered as or constituting a "theological source" (locum theologicum ,
n.2) which the faithful might invoke in practice.
I should think that the proper concern of the New York State
Catholic Conference (to which this paper was first presented) is how
actual Catholic teaching applies to actually Catholic hospit als. Our
proper concern here is not individual or collective theological units
nor especially persons who dissent from authentic Catholic teaching
- these persons and/or units sponsor no hospital that I know ofrather, our legitimate concern is for Catholic hospitals whose chartered and incorporated purposes rest on, reflect and witness to the
sacred and certain teaching doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church. 23

Kindly refer to "Text of Doctrinal Congregation Statement on Sterilization, " reprinted from the August, 1976 Linacre Quarterly , on page 117.
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Text of Doctrinal Congregation
Statement on Sterilization
Following is a translation of the
statement, A Document about
Sterilization in Catholic H ospitals, issued March 13,1975, by
the Vatican's Doctrinal Congregation in response to questions
from the U. S. National Conference of Catholic Bishops.
This sacred congregation has
diligently considered not only the
problem of contraceptive sterilization for therapeutic purposes
but also the opinions indicated by
different people toward a solution , and the conflicts relative to
requests for cooperation in such
sterilizations in Catholic hospitals. The congregation has resolved to respond to these quest.ions in this way:
1. Any sterilization which of itself, that is, of its own nature and
condition, has the sole immediate
effect of rendering the generative
faculty incapable of procreation is
to be considered direct sterilization, as the term is understood in
the declarations of the pontifical
magisterium, especially of Pius
XIV Therefore, notwithstanding
any subjectively right intention of
those whose actions are prompted
by the care or prevention of
physical or mental illness which
is foreseen or feared as a result of
pregnancy, such sterilization remains absolutely forbidden according to the doctrine of the
Church. And indeed the sterili-
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zation of the faculty itself is forbidden for an even graver reason
than the sterilization of individual acts, since it induces a state
of sterility in the person which is
almost always irreversible.
Neither can any mandate of
public authority, which would
seek to impose direct sterilization as necessary for the common
good, be invoked, for such sterilization damages the dignity and
inviolability of the human person. 2 Likewise, neither can one
invoke the principle of totality in
this case, in virtue of which principle interference with organs is
justified for the greater good of
the person: sterility intended in
itself is not oriented to the integral good of the person as rightly pursued "the proper order of
goods being preserved"3 inasmuch as it damages the ethical
good of the person, which is the
highest good, since it deliberately
deprives for e see n and freely
chosen sexual activity of an essential element. Thus article 20
of the medical-ethics code promulgated by the conference in
1971 faithfully reflects the doctrine which is to be held, and its
observance should be urged.
2. The congregation, while it
confirms this traditional doctrine
of the Church, is not unaware of
the dissent against this teaching
from many theologians. The con-
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